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The Ethical Dignity of Human Soul ...  
(شأن اخلاقي النفس؛ جايگاه اعتقاد به نفس در حل مسائل اخلاقي از نگاه غزالي و أكويناس)

intellect.

Despite Al-Ghazali and Aquinas’ insistence on the cognitive role of the intellect, why do some people dare to commit vices and sins? The answer to this question is one of the common points between the two scholars. Al-Ghazali argues that carnal desires may overcome the intellect and thus they may obstruct the intellect by preventing it from perceiving the issues correctly. Due to his insistence on the human will, Aquinas says that man’s will is too strong to constantly obey the instructions of the intellect, and thus even a weak will may be attracted by the charming affairs of things which are disvalued by the intellect.

One of the strong points of Al-Ghazali’s philosophy of ethics is his attention to the different levels of aptitude of individuals for the acquisition of virtues, which is harmonious with Aristotle’s ethics. In fact, why Aristotelian ethics is compatible with the religious ethics is partly due to his attention to the different levels of individuals’ aptitude. As bodily illnesses require different treatments, different spiritual illnesses require different prescriptions too, and one should distinguish the issue of different backgrounds from that of relativism.

Due to his insistence on the training of soul as the subject matter of ethics, Al-Ghazali surpasses Aquinas in dealing with the description of soul and its faculties and with the enumeration of virtues and ties between knowing of soul and ethics. Al-Ghazali has talked about the so-called “ethical motivation”, too. He has introduced some matters about the role of motivation of the intellect. Purportedly, Al-Ghazali holds that Allah has fixed a particular inclination or will subject to the intellect in the nature of man. Following what the intellect may understand, this will motivates man to do something or leave something. Will, in Al-Ghazali’s point of view, is a mediator between the knowledge of ethics and ethical practice that motivates man to act after distinguishing between good and evil by one’s intellect. However, Aquinas’ persistence on the issue of “intention” and ethical motivation is more than Al-Ghazali’s. Aquinas argues that an act can be of virtue or vice at this phase of intention which is prior to its outer realization.

Aquinas embraces the role of practical intellect in doing an action, too. He says what man is inclined to do can be done through the practical intellect. Since such an action concerns what one desires, he is responsible for it. Although he, as Al-Ghazali, argued that the first origination of an act is in our theoretical intellect rather than our practical one, Aquinas held some mutual relation between man’s choice and his thoughts; man’s choices that determine his character can be actualized through his thoughts. Both choices and thoughts, however, are brought about by their being localized
nature, rather than the Christian theology. Aquinas thus argues that we can reach happiness merely because we are creatures who want to be happy (Wang, 2007, p. 329).

In a nutshell, both Aquinas and Al-Ghazali think that this worldly happiness is neither perfect nor autonomous. Although one can reach happiness in this world, one’s perfect and ultimate happiness is practical only through divine grace and after one has passed away from this world to the hereafter. Aquinas has distinguished three kinds of happiness. First, the happiness brought about by a life in compliance with ethical virtues which suggest inner complacency. Second, earthly happiness in terms of which one’s both body and soul may enjoy the outer good. Third, the superhuman and eternal happiness within the scope of which one’s resurrected body will come in terms with one’s ideas and thoughts on the Day of Judgment.

**Summing up and assessment**

From the above statements, we can infer that Al-Ghazali begins his study of ethics with the genuine essence of human being, i.e. human soul. This study encompasses issues such as the nature of human soul, the faculties of soul, the origin of soul, the aim and destination of soul, and the happiness and unhappiness of soul. The gauge by which an act can be good or bad, in Al-Ghazali’s point of view, is the extent of influence they may leave on the soul of the ethical agent.

Knowing the ethical end, Aquinas argues, depends on knowing the concept of the good, and in Aristotle’s definition, the good for any essence is the actualization of that good for it. As to human being, the good is a state or activity on which depends the perfect actualization of man; it is called “happiness” by the middle age later philosophers who followed religious tradition.

Al-Ghazali seems to take more aspects of the ontological study of good and evil into account; his definition of virtue depends on the concept of intellect. Good character, Al-Ghazali argues, is a state by which bodily faculties come to obey the faculty of intellect. Aquinas’ definition of virtue is proportionally influenced by the Greek tradition of ethics, by the Aristotelian definition, however at last becomes similar to Al-Ghazali’s. Virtue, according to Aquinas, is a mental fixed disposition when attained, one can practice in compliance with one’s natural disposition, namely man’s archetype or rational soul. As a result, an act in compliance with man’s natural disposition is an act according to man’s intellect, and similarly sins and vices are acts contrary to man’s
knowing God, that of being annihilated in Him and His remembrance regarding them as the best kinds of pleasures. He did not deny the lawful sexual pleasure, and due food and clothing, either. These necessities can be managed through the controlling faculties of soul, rather than their dominion over the soul (Al-Ghazali, 1368 S. H., p. 70).

For Al-Ghazali, wealth and properties play an independent role in reaching happiness, though they may win a lesser degree of importance when compared to other external gifts. Viewing the fact that they are transient and thus are not proportionate to man’s eternity, Al-Ghazali does not regard the enjoyment of such gifts as a genuine objective of life (Al-Ghazali, 489 A. H., pp. 52, 107).

Ethical virtues are among the key constituents of human happiness. It is necessary, however, to understand the definition of virtue as an introduction to happiness in order to know the relation between the acquisition of virtues and attaining happiness. Virtue is regarded by Aristotle as human virtue, for it is man who is in constant search of his happiness and good (Aristotle, 1385 S. H., p. 46). Virtue, Aristotle says, is a fixed disposition by which one chooses a mean between two extremes in accordance with the intellectual standards and practical wisdom (Ibid., p.66).

The word of virtue in the Greek philosophers’ view was free of religious content and values such as faith, devotion, and trust in God. Hence, wherever an ethical virtue is set forth in the Greek works of philosophy of ethics, they mean those mental dispositions and actions which are valued regardless of their religious outlook, such as carriage, chastity, and justice. One can say that these are what referred to by Al-Ghazali as philosophical virtues. Such virtues may be found out by the sincere intellect which is freed of *shari‘a*, however they can be confirmed by *shari‘a*.

In order to draw distinction between such virtues and those which can merely be understood in a religious context, Aquinas and some other theist philosophers have construed the latter virtues as “theological virtues”. Al-Ghazali has introduced them as religious virtues, too. In a part of his theological project, Aquinas wanted to draw some philosophical conclusion in terms of the consideration of human life and of the analysis of human intellect and will. Man is able to know what is right and what is good and we as human beings are able to achieve the unlimited good. From the presence of such inclination towards the general good in men, Aquinas has inferred that it can be attainable. He argues that the presence of such inclination want or aptitude for attaining it suffices for its realization; that is the presence of any aptitude suffices for the very aptitude being actualized. This conclusion, as it is seen, is drawn from the Aristotelian philosophy of
result, a good act (virtue) is an act in compliance with the intellect and similarly “disobedience” or ethical vice is an irrational fixed disposition. Aquinas, however, says that when doing good acts (virtues), one is not only required to comply with ones’ disposition, but also with ones’ intellect (Gilson, 1379 S. H., p. 503).

The supernatural law of revelation, in Aquinas’ point of view, is no substitute for the natural law to which man is inclined, although the latter may be complemented by the former. Virtues not only do suggest the embracement and following of natural laws, but also they manifest the supernatural virtues by adding some supernatural virtues such as faith, hope, altruism, and the like. Virtues, according to Aquinas, include both the ethical and intellectual good. For an individual to be ethically good he is in need of ethical virtues which in turn depend on his practical reason (McEnery, 2006, p. 205).

**Al-Ghazali and Aquinas’ views on human soul and happiness**

Al-Ghazali has begun his philosophy of ethics with what constitutes human essence namely human soul, neither with the virtues and vices nor with the bodily right or wrong acts. The ethical study of human soul comprises the nature of soul, its origin, its situation after death, the purpose of its creation, the relation between soul and body, the faculties of soul, and man’s real happiness and unhappiness.

The issues of human nature and its ethical aim which constitute Al-Ghazali’s foremost discussion in his philosophy of ethics are totally dependent on his conception of human soul and his views about human character, virtues and vices. Al-Ghazali holds that such discussions will not be productive prior to self-realization and self-purification (Al-Ghazali, 1368 S. H., pp. 10-11). Such a background, however, led to a detailed introduction in Al-Ghazali’s *Kimiyyat-e Sa’adat*. Although his *Ihya’u Al-Ulum* has not begun with the study of soul, in the four sections particularly the last two, Al-Ghazali has dealt with it as demanded by ethics.

First, Al-Ghazali surveys man’s hedonistic outlook on the worldly gifts, rejecting it by two reasons. First, worldly pleasures do not endure for long, i.e. after the short lifespan of an individual they will come to an end (Al-Ghazali, 489 A. H., Vol. 4, pp. 51-52, 109, 178-88). Second, worldly pleasures are not pure or perfect, but mingled with different sorts of pain. Such enjoyments, therefore, cannot be embraced as the aim of life (Ibid., pp. 52, 107). His view, of course, does not mean the denial of all worldly pleasures, for he respects for the pleasure of knowledge particularly
the desirable) and to some verses of the Qur’an. Nonetheless, he considers
divine favor as the only secure way to distinguish between intellectual
activities and carnal desires; if somebody is not certain about receiving such
a favor, he/she should pray for guidance at the court of heaven (Ibid., p.
61).

This is one of Al-Ghazali’s ways to amend his ethical system of virtues in
contrast with what is available in Greek philosophy (Sherif, 1975, p. 50).
Good character is the product of man’s activities, and the mere training of
mental faculties, and even knowledge would fail to accomplish it by
themselves; rather good character depends on the inclinations which create
our actions (Al-Ghazali, 489 A. H., Vol. 3, p. 2). Having enumerated good
and evil deeds in his works, Al-Ghazali went to classify and refer to them
sometimes as their instances, sometimes as regard to the pragmatic aspect,
and another time as regard to the cognitive bases.

A virtuous life is, Al-Ghazali holds, manageable through the superiority of
intellect over other faculties of soul. Virtue or “good character”, as Al-
Ghazali has put it, is a mental state within which all bodily faculties follow
practical faculty, i.e. the practical intellect. Disposition (khulq) is a fixed
mental temperament in terms of which we do things instantly and without
contemplation about it. Such deeds are called good disposition (virtues) if
they are legally and intellectually praiseworthy, and evil disposition (vices) if
otherwise. Those actions which are not fixed in the mind but may happen
accidentally or by coincidence are not reckoned as the disposition of the
agent.

Aquinas’ definition of virtue is not dissimilar to Al-Ghazali’s both
views of the intellect and the virtues fixed in the soul. Similarly, the
middle age theologians made their efforts to maintain what seemed sound
to them from the Greek ethics. Thus, one can hardly draw a distinction
between the Greek thoughts and those of the middle age theologians.
However, if we follow up the thoughts of such theologians particularly
Aquinas, we will know that they considered “disobedience”, the most
important concept in Christian ethics, as an act suggesting vices. Hence, we
are to shed light on vice and its antonym namely virtue (Gilson, 1379 S. H.,
p. 501).

The middle age definition of virtue is rooted in the Aristotelian definition
of Greek ethics. Virtue, Aquinas holds, is a fixed mental state of acquisition
which when acquired one can do it in compliance with his nature (Aquinas,
1994, I-II- Q. 71, Art. 2). Natural disposition, the compliance or none-
compliance with which would respectively give rise to virtue or vices, is
something which locates every being in its typical peculiar position; in the
case of human beings (Homo sapiens), this nature is the rational soul. As a
and training. He notices the creation of the character for an individual that urges him to do what is good. What we do is not like the outcome of a chemical experiment in a lab where we reach similar result after combining two certain elements in some identical circumstances. If man lacked freedom of action and were he predetermined, there would be no room for philosophy of ethics. Just as natural sciences are dependent upon many variables, talking about ethics depends on the possibility of doing things freely. For talking of rewards or punishments and of commandments or prohibitions would not be possible otherwise. His defense for freedom of action which shows a meta-religious color is that human intellect will choose one when facing a few alternatives. Thinking is a mental activity and our practical intellect fails to force us do one particular action.

The relation of acquiring virtues to human soul

Having regarded the purification and perfection of soul as the way for acquiring virtues, Al-Ghazali has gone to give his definition of virtues in his works such as Mizan-u Al-‘Amal. There, he holds that good character acquisition is viable through one’s longing for good manners, assuming them, and getting used to them (Al-Ghazali, 1374 S. H., p. 69).

Good character, in Al-Ghazali’s point of view, is a situation where bodily faculties follow the faculty of intellect; such a situation is distinguished from that of committing sin or bad temperament. If the faculty of thinking is educated, the virtue of intellect (wisdom) will be produced; and then chastity is brought about by training of concupiscence, and courage is created by subduing anger. In general, the obedience of our animal faculties to the intellect and their education can give rise to the virtue of justice (Al-Ghazali, 489 A. H., Vol. 3, pp. 1-2).

There is another faculty in human nature which is satanic and urges the two faculties of anger and concupiscence to disobey intellect. Intellect and this satanic faculty are two hostile powers and both go to respectively either save or destroy man’s soul; if the former is defeated by the latter, vices and sins come into being (Amin Abdullah, 1992, pp. 162-163).

In his Mizan-ul-‘Amal, Al-Ghazali has classified otherwise, regarding intellect as the faculty for searching remedy and the other two faculties as carnal desires. Intellect and carnal desires are in constant conflict, so that for acquiring virtues our desires must obey our intellect. In compliance to the statements of philosophers, Al-Ghazali explains that in the course of such a fight the struggle is more difficult for our intellect (Al-Ghazali, 1374 S. H., p. 60). As to this issue, Al-Ghazali refers to some traditions (such as; the way to Heaven is filled with the detestable but the way to Hell is filled with
can fortify his will by self-mortification and disobeying the carnal desire (Al-Ghazali, 1990, pp. 277-288).

“Choice” and “decision”, in Aquinas’ point of view, are the essential constituents of human actions; that is, man is living in the domain of alternative actions. He holds that “choice” is peculiar to those beings that in the light of their intellect are able to knowingly prefer one action to another. What Aquinas means by this definition is not that action follows a man’s choice or decision as they are assumed prior to actions by most people; rather, he says that they are a sort of action themselves, and in describing them he goes to explain how a man makes a decision or a choice. He says one’s all choices which determine one’s character, are developed through one’s thoughts. The case is that choice stems from decision and both are developed from their localization in different situations (Davies, 2002, p. 14).

Aquinas goes on to argue about the decision-making process and then explains the cycle within which one is able to choose a reasonable alternative. Action, Aquinas says, comes out of anything attractive to him, i.e. anything considered good by him. Before an action takes place, we might be uninformed about how to get the ideal outcome, though we know we want to get it somehow. Moreover, since we face different ways and one of them may make the course difficult for us, the intellect comes into play to guide us (Aquinas, 1994, I-II, Q. 14, Art. 1).

He does not look at the decision-making process as an aid to clarify the domain of what we want to do or must do; rather in such an outlook, we make a choice in the light of our inclinations, rather than the very decision-making process. A decision-making process in turn presupposes its own different ends, objectives, and purposes (Ibid. Art. 2). Wherever in the phases of the process, our wants cause our actions, our inclinations may come into play within the cycle. Thus, an action performed in a particular way is not proposed merely as an action, but as the activity of a man who was inclined to do that particular action and who has lots of tastes, likes, and dislikes. An imperative conclusion Aquinas draws from this discussion is that man’s action and character are tied up together. He argues that there are different actions which we as individuals may want to choose, however our wants may be influenced by our previous performances or by the choices we are making (Davies, 2002, p. 15).

Consequently, virtues and vices are inclinations to act in a certain way. Virtues help us do what is good, while vices drive us to do what is evil. It should be noted that contrary to some ethical theorists, Aquinas does not regard obedience or disobedience of laws as the basis of the evaluation of human action. Rather, he considers our action as the outcome of education
of a few verses from the Qur’an (Sherif, 1975, p. 28). In his *Tabaqat-ul-Falasefa*, Al-Ghazali accepts the philosophers’ enumeration of the faculties of the mind. Furthermore, he confesses that what is said in philosophy on the mind is not denied by the religious tradition (Al-Ghazali, 1987, pp. 297-303).

Some part of the issue of human soul in relation to ethics deals with the knowledge of mental faculties and their functions. Prior to his examination of the four virtues, Al-Ghazali draws our attention to the origins of virtues and vices in human soul which are: the faculties of imagination, concupiscence, and anger. These three faculties may help to reach salvation and perfection or may prevent from perfection leading man to misery (Ibrahimi Deinani, 1370 S. H., p. 220).

Contrary to the external ones, the internal senses have no organs of operation and their origin is brain (Al-Ghazali, 489 A. H., Vol. 3, p. 5). Like some modern psychologists, Al-Ghazali believes in the localization of functions of different faculties in different areas of the brain (Umarudin, 1996, p. 92). Accordingly, he considers mind superior to body and as the source of all activities which motivates body in compliance with its needs; even the physical growth is dependent on the mind (Ibid., pp. 4-5).

Instinctive inclinations, anger, and imagination are common between man and animal, but human soul distinguishes him from animal in terms of his intellect and will. Intellect is man’s major faculty of understanding which helps him produce and develop his ideas. The concept of man’s will is different from that of animal, for in man it stems from intellect but in animal it stems from anger or concupiscence. Instinctive inclination and anger are the bases of other mental faculties. Hence, if practical faculties are not directed correctly, the produced acts are referred to as vices or sins, but if they are managed to produce good situations, those acts are called virtues or good character.

The above explanations on the body-soul distinction and mental faculties elucidate the dependency of ethics on those faculties. Human soul has the potentiality to get in contact with two different levels. In its contact with the lower level, the soul organizes and manages the body; and in its contact with the higher level, it earns the intellectual knowledge. Knowing ethics is the function of our intellect, but the motivation behind is provided by man’s will and inclination. It is worthy to note, however, that were man’s innate nature intact and free from deviation and he knew the good and evil, he would show a propensity for the good or aversion to the evil in deciding to do what is good and to abstain from what is evil. The infirmity of purpose may make a man commit vices and neglect virtuous deeds; however, man
The Ethical Dignity of Human Soul …
(شأن الاخلاقي نفس؛ جایگاه اعتقاد به نفس در حل مسائل اخلاقی از نگاه غزالي و آکونیناس)

The relation of human soul to ethics

A glance at Al-Ghazali’s works suggests that his mind was engaged in issues dealt with modern psychology of ethics. The significance of such issues made Al-Ghazali focus on the analysis of human soul, distinction of its faculties, and related virtues in his two major works of ethics, namely Mizan-ul-A’mal and Ihya Ulum-I Al-Din. Like Muslim Philosophers such as Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina as to the distinction of soul from body and the originality of the former, Al-Ghazali has embraced the words of Plato and Aristotle. Like Muslim philosophers and unlike Plato, however, he holds the eternity of human soul, and contrary to Aristotle, he does not hold its mortality after death. Al-Ghazali has regarded Ibn Sina’s and Al-Farabi’s works as the most reliable resources for understanding of Greek philosophy. As to human soul and its faculties, he is directly influenced by Ibn Sina and indirectly by the tradition of Greek philosophy particularly Aristotle (Amin Abdullah, 1992, p. 161). Concerning enumeration of the faculties of soul, however altering their order and leaving out the external senses, he is influenced by Ibn Sina (Rahman, 1952, p. 25-31).

As to this matter, Al-Ghazali sheds light on the meanings of four terms: qalb (heart), nafs (mind), rub (soul), aql (intellect). Having intended not to make use of philosophical terms in his Ihya’ Ulum-I Al-Din, he prefers to use the very term of qalb in a sense that is different from its common meaning in biology, for it has a divine origin whereas the body is made of matter. The essence of man is this very incorporeal qalb (heart) installed in the body and controls the physical activities. The physical heart is its physical manifestation (Sherif, 1975, p. 2). He refers to the faculties of soul as the soldiers of heart (Al-Ghazali, 489 A. H., Vol.3, p. 3).

He has talked in details about both the theoretical intellect and practical intellect, and studied the Aristotelian virtues in terms of the analysis of the faculties of soul. Following the tradition of Greek philosophy, these virtues are: “Wisdom” as the virtue of the faculty of intellect, “courage” as the virtue of the faculty of anger, “chastity” as the virtue of the concupiscent faculty, and at last “justice” as the sound operation of all faculties, their harmony and equilibrium in human soul paves the way for those virtues. As to the issue of human soul, Al-Ghazali is more influenced by the Islamic philosophy rather than by the Islamic traditions. Despite his emphasis on the mind as the best disciplines of knowledge, Al-Ghazali suffices with the narration
Introduction

It is not inadvertent that the author came to deal with Al-Ghazali and Aquinas in this paper, for despite their differences in time, life, nationality, and religion, they have a few similarities in their thoughts. Not only both Al-Ghazali and Aquinas were influential in the later scholars, but also their thoughts are embraced by the modern world. They have embraced the Aristotelian virtue ethics as the foundation of their philosophy of ethics. Due to their belief in virtue ethics and like other virtue theorists, they believe in human soul and consider happiness as the health of human soul and unhappiness as its illness. They disagree with Aristotle in their belief in the eternal life and religious outlook on ethics, thus Aquinas has added religious virtues and Al-Ghazali added *sufic* virtues to Aristotle's views. The author has particularly shown despite their similarities in ethical theory, human soul in Al-Ghazali’s view has a better status than in Aquinas’.

The ontological attitude to ethical properties

Al-Ghazali stands in line with those scholars who evaluate ethical acts in terms of their final consequences, i.e. the eternal happiness in the hereafter. A good action, he says, leads men into a happy ending in the hereafter, and a bad action holds men back from such happiness (Al-Ghazali, 1988, p. 227). The extent an action is good or bad may vary in proportion to the effects it leaves on the soul of a moral agent (Al-Ghazali, 489 A. H., Vol. 4, pp. 119-21). Accordingly, Al-Ghazali’s ethics, on the one hand, can be called the ethics for human soul, and on the other hand, the ethics of happiness which aims at summum bonum, contrary to hedonistic ethics (Abulquasem, 1978, p. 25).

Aquinas holds that ethical properties have realities beyond the mere emotions and affections (Aquinas, 1994, Q, 3). He maintains that such ethical properties have an origin beyond human understanding, they depend on the source of revelation which comes merely from the divine guidance or on the systematically laws of nature which owes to our sound understanding of the nature. Such realistic attitude which is thus a combination of Christian doctrine of revelation and Stoic idea on the fixed laws in the context of nature, led to the development of an ethical system by Aquinas known as on-laws-of-nature ethics (Gilson, 1379 S. H., pp. 511-513).
The Ethical Dignity of Human Soul
(The Reflections of Al-Ghazali and Aquinas on the Role of Belief in Human Soul in the Solution of Ethical Issues)

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Mohsen Javadi **
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Abstract

Muhammad Al-Ghazali and Thomas Aquinas have respectively played a considerable role in Islam and Christianity. Religious attitude can be seen in their works; and the body-soul distinction is thus one of the issues that suggest the two scholars' religious attitudes. Ethical issues are among many others seriously proposed for examination in the works of Al-Ghazali and Aquinas. This paper aims to examine how their philosophy of ethics is influenced by their belief in the body-soul distinction and to what extent the former issue is developed by the latter, highlighting the fact that Al-Ghazali has a more significant role than Aquinas.

Keywords: Al-Ghazali, Aquinas, philosophy of ethics, human soul, virtue.

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