An investigation on following the norm of belief | ||
| حکمت و فلسفه | ||
| Article 5, Volume 12, Issue 46, July 2016, Pages 73-92 PDF (547.16 K) | ||
| Document Type: Research Paper | ||
| DOI: 10.22054/wph.2016.6750 | ||
| Author | ||
| Sayed Ali kalantari* | ||
| Abstract | ||
| On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis, there is a normative relation between belief and its content. The normative relation is typically formulated by a norm which is called "the norm of belief" in the literature such that "one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true" (Shah 2003, 2009). My focus in this paper, concerns an argument regarding the normativity of belief thesis which is called "the no norm argument" developed by Gluer and Wikforss (2009, 2010, 2013, 2015). On the basis of the argument, Gluer and Wikforss claim that the norm of belief does not have the role of guidance for the act of belief formation. On this ground they conclude the implausibility of the normativity of belief thesis. The key aim of the present paper is to criticize Gluer and Wikforss's claim. To this aim, after considering the normativity of belief thesis, I will specify the scope of actions which is constrained by the norm of belief. After criticizing Gluer and Wikforss's claim, I will end the paper by an analysis of following the norm of belief on the basis of the normativity of belief thesis. | ||
| Keywords | ||
| belief; normativity; norm; Guidance; truth | ||
| References | ||
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