Justifiability of John Rolls's Theory of Justice, Examination of Habermas Critique and Search for Answers based on the Role of General Facts | ||
| حکمت و فلسفه | ||
| Article 4, Volume 17, Issue 67, September 2021, Pages 87-112 PDF (873.63 K) | ||
| Document Type: Research Paper | ||
| DOI: 10.22054/wph.2021.58328.1942 | ||
| Authors | ||
| Marzieh Foroozandeh* 1; Saeed Zibakalam Monfared2; Hossein Mesbahian3 | ||
| 1Ph.D in Contemporary philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 2Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 3Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran | ||
| Abstract | ||
| John Rawls's theory of justice is one of the most famous views in the political philosophy of the twentieth century. Contemporary German philosopher Yurgen Habermas believes that Rawls cannot justify this theory. Because the justification for this theory is based on some special premises that can not be compatible with other Rawls's essential views. This article examines Habermas's critique by carefully reading Rawls' theory of justice. It seems that Habermas's critique can be answered in two ways: The first answer seeks justification in what Rawls calls the "public reason" of a society. This answer is more in line with Rawls' appearance, but Habermas considers this interpretation of Rawls's theory to be contextualist and does not accept it. The second answer tries to focus on the concept of "general facts" in Rawls's theory, and provide a basis for the universal and non-contextual justification of Rawls's theory; the basis that Habermas claimed Rawls lacked. | ||
| Keywords | ||
| John Rawls; Jürgen Habermas; theory of justice; justification | ||
| References | ||
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