An Internal Incompatibility in Internal Realism | ||
| حکمت و فلسفه | ||
| Article 5, Volume 17, Issue 67, September 2021, Pages 113-133 PDF (642.64 K) | ||
| Document Type: Research Paper | ||
| DOI: 10.22054/wph.2021.47209.1771 | ||
| Author | ||
| Hamed Ghadiri* | ||
| Ph.D. in Logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| Abstract | ||
| During the 80s, Hilary Putnam developed a metaphysical viewpoint called 'internal realism'. Its slogan said, "the mind and the world together make up the mind and the world." According to Putnam, internal realism has two elements: 1) conceptual relativity and 2) seeing truth as idealized rational assertability. Here it will be argued that there is an internal incompatibility in the second element; i.e. truth as idealized rational assertability. To explain this incompatibility, firstly it will be shown that the idealization of rational assertability is duo to Putnam's emphasis on realistic intuitions of truth. Secondly, it will be shown that Putnam prefers to use 'sufficiently good conditions' instead of 'ideal conditions' to make a distinction between his idea and pierce's. Finally, it will be argued that some implication of 'sufficiently good conditions' is incompatible with those realistic intuitions of truth. Hence, one can conclude that there is an incompatibility in Putnam's attitude toward truth. | ||
| Keywords | ||
| Internal realism; Hilary Putnam; Rational assertability; Metaphysical realism | ||
| References | ||
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