

Seyyed Hassan Hosseini

(سید حسن حسینی)

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Tabatabaei's argument is said to be shorter and less complicated. He says that the reality in external world is itself sufficient to explain and to prove the existence of a necessary being. His argument is as follows:

1. There is existence
2. Existence is necessary existent.
3. Necessarily, there is a necessary existent (Tabatabaei, 1982, pp. 70-82).

As said before, the main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the degree of suspension of these arguments on the PSR, regardless of the accuracy or validity or truth of the arguments and their premises. Regarding these arguments some issues are worthy to be mentioned here:

Undoubtedly, all three versions of the arguments do not need the principle of causality or the principle of the impossibility of infinite regress, nevertheless the reliance of these arguments on the PSR is questionable or disputable.

Sadra's argument as stated in *Asfar*, seems to have employed the PSR. One may think that premise (3) has astutely and tacitly used the PSR, since the lower degrees of the existence in this doctrine are to be explained by the higher degrees, and if there were no highest degree, the lower degrees could not have been brought into existence. This is a soft version of the PSR that explains some beings in the virtue of the others. Nevertheless, there is a way to even emancipate the argument from such an abandoned version of the PSR. In other words, if we interpret the argument as that the simple reality of the existence entails the perfection in the hierarchy of existence; it would not presuppose the PSR.

Sabzewari's and Tabatabaei's versions of Sadra's *Siddiqin* argument do not rely on any version of the PSR at all. There are absolutely independent arguments of the PSR, and if the validity and truth of the premises were granted, those are most likely among the best arguments for the existence of God.

To conclude, I think that the Cosmological Arguments are founded on the strong version of the PSR, while Sadra's *Siddiqin* argument at most depends on a weak version of the PSR, nevertheless an interpretation of Sadra's argument alongside Sabzewari's and Tabatabaei's arguments are fundamentally indigent of any versions of the PSR, the Causal Principle and the impossibility of infinite regress.

4. Existence is simple and singular (the principle of simplicity of existence).

As it is clear, the premise (1) emphasizes the realistic approach of Islamic Philosophy in both ontological and epistemological levels, though the latter arises different theories in different schools. Premise (2) indicates the principality of existence and that the reality of things refer to existence rather than the essence. Premise (3) implies that the reality of existence is one and at the same time many, and thus the differences between existents are due to the intensity and weakness, or perfection and imperfection, or to priority and posteriority. Indeed intensity and weakness are only degrees of reality. This is called the gradation or ambiguity of existence which plays a crucial role in Sadra's Siddigin argument. Premise (4) indicates the simplicity of existence that requires that existence does not have any part or aspect, but is one simple reality which by virtue of its being one is many.

Based on these premises, Sadra concludes that:

Existence, as it was said before, is one, real and simple truth that there is no difference between its individuals in its essence except in completeness and deficiency and intensity and weakness or by additional matters as in individuals of species. And its perfection does not belong to something else...the existence is either needless to something else or needs- in its essence-something else...

Therefore, it is proved and is made clear that the existence is either complete in its truth and necessary in its identity or needy in its essence to that and belongs substantially to that. So according to each kind it is proved and explained that the existence of necessary existence is independent (Sadra, 1981, vol. 6, pp. 13-15).

After Sadra, some of his commentators have been trying to reconstruct or reconsider the argument in ways which are said to be less indigent to presuppose principles. Sabzewari (1797-1828) and Tabatabaei (1902-1981) are among the most famous disciples and followers of Sadra.

One may restate Sabzewari's argument is as follows:

1. Existence is fundamental.
2. Existence as such contradicts non existence.
3. Existence as such is necessarily existent.
4. Existence as such is necessary existence (Sabzewari, 1995, pp. 105-107).

14-20). In fact, Sadra criticizes Ibn Sina's so-called *Siddigin* argument and believes that all those versions need some logical or metaphysical principles such as the Causal Principle or the impossibility of infinite regress (Ibid., pp. 25-27).

Now I examine Sadra's argument. First, let's see what he has said in his philosophical masterpiece, Asfar:

The reality of existence (haqiqat al-wujud), by virtue of its being a simple thing (amran basitan), not possessing an essence or a constituent property or a means of being defined, is identical to the Necessary, requiring the most complete perfection that is infinitely intense, because every other degree [of existence], which is weaker in intensity is not the pure reality of existence. Rather, it is existence with deficiency since the deficiency of everything is other than that thing necessarily. The deficiency of existence is not existence itself but rather its privation and this privation is merely attached to existence concomitantly and not the foundation of existence, due to its actuality in a subsequent degree [of existence] and what comes after that. Deficiencies and privations comprise secondary [entities] insofar as they are secondary, but the First is its complete perfection, which has no definition and nothing may be conceived that is more perfect than it. Deficiency and ontological indigence issue from emanation and existentiation and are perfected by it [the Necessary]. The haecceity of these secondaries is attached to the First. So he treats their deficiencies with his perfection and their ontological indigence with his ontological richness. Thus through this demonstration is the existence of the Necessary proven (Sadra, 1981, vol. 6, pp. 17-18).

This argument is based on three main philosophical doctrines; "the Principality of Existence", "the Gradation or the Ambiguity of Existence" and "the Simplicity of Existence" (Sadra, 1981, vol. 1). These are all proved by Sadra and none is presupposed *a priori*. Sadra's premises are as follow:

1. There is an existence (the principle of ontological realism).
2. Existence is fundamentally real (the principality of existence over essence).
3. Existence is equivocally many and diverse (the principle of gradation of existence).

arguments from contingency.

The second concern is why I have selected Sadra among many Islamic Philosophers as far as the Cosmological Argument is concerned. To find the answer it is worth mentioning that besides the importance of Sadra as an exceptional and prominent philosopher, I believe that Sadra's *Siddigin* Argument is one of the most realistic and perhaps most unrestrained arguments regarding the founding of the argument on other logical or metaphysical principles. In fact, I will be attempting to prove that Sadra's *Siddigin* Argument is so rich and abundant to be presupposed on any other presumptions. Moreover, I think that Sadra's *Siddigin* argument neither requires such principle as the PSR, nor it purports to be in need of any principle rather than its own philosophical principles.

The third concern, though not very important in our discussion is whether the PSR is proved or presupposed in Islamic philosophy context. The answer I think is definitely affirmative. I believe that in Islamic Philosophy the content of this principle (even in its strong version) is attempted to be argued and proved.

For instance, the Causal Principle which is an important layer of the PSR is being proved in different ways and by various schools, and that is almost putative that the highest sense of the Causal Principle which requires the inseparable necessity of a cause and a caused is accepted by almost all Islamic philosophers; or the so-called "principle of neutrality of essence over the existence and non-existence" is a significant mode of the PSR.

Undeniably Sadra is the most influential philosopher after Ibn Sina. Among his various works in philosophy, theology, mysticism and scripture exegeses, he attempted to provide a wide-ranging synthesis of approaches to the new and firmest methods of arguing for the existence of God. (Nasr, 1997, pp. 31-50)

Sadra mentions that there are many proofs for the existence of God, because there are many signs that indicate him and facets about him; however he states that some ways are more firm and valid. He adds that the most firm proof for the existence of God is what he calls *Siddigin* argument, method of the most voracious (Sadra, 1981, vol. 6, pp. 14-34). In this way, it is said that God and his attributes are all perceived and proved by contemplating the reality of existence without any need to other principles. Sadra distinguishes this argument from other classic proofs. It has to be mentioned that there is a gap in meaning between Sadra's employment of this term and what Ibn Sina had meant of such a classification of theological arguments (Sadra, 1981, vol. 6, pp.

(1) The proposition that there is a unique necessary being who brought about the existence of everything other than itself by willing that other beings should exist, would, if true, explain why there are contingent beings.

(2) There is a possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent beings.

(3) There is no proposition consistent with the claim that there are only contingent beings which, if true, would explain why there are contingent beings.

(4) Any possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent beings entails that there is necessary being.

(5) It is reasonable to believe that there is a necessary being.

To conclude, the arguments that are called the Cosmological Arguments in Western Philosophy literature are firmly and unavoidably relied on the strong version of the PSR, and any attempt to emancipate the Cosmological Argument from the PSR is inclusive and fruitless.

III

In this part I will explain and examine Sadra's so-called *Siddigin* argument for the existence of God. First it is worth mentioning that although the logic of division of theistic arguments for the existence of God differs fundamentally between Western and Islamic Philosophers, Sadra's *Siddigin* Argument can be regarded as a Cosmological Argument according to the terminology of philosophical theology. In other words, since Sadra's *Siddigin* Argument purports to employ its main and first premise from the external and real world, it is an *a posteriori* synthetic argument, and thus can be explicitly called as a Cosmological Argument. This is crucial for someone who may ask the logic of comparative study between Clarke's and Sadra's arguments for the existence of God. Therefore, and in contrast to what is usually said in this discussion, (see for instance: Ayatollahi 2005, pp. 115-120) while Sadra's *Siddigin* Argument is correspondent to the Cosmological Argument, the so-called necessity-contingency arguments cannot be classified as a Cosmological Argument according to the Islamic philosophy, since the first premise begins with the fact that every entity requires existence or otherwise, the former is a necessary being and the latter is a contingent being, however this premise has not emerged from the external world, but the very *a priori* analysis of human intellect. That clearly represents the difference between Western literature employment of sense of contingency in the context of Cosmological Argument and Islamic Philosophy approach toward

Arguments and have gained some degrees of acceptance among philosophers.

According to the first criticism, it makes no sense to apply the notion of cause or explanation to the totality of things, and the arguments used to show that the whole of existing things must have a cause or explanation are fallacious. Russell took this view that the concept of cause as applicable to the universe conceived as the total collection of things in the argument (Russell 1964, p. 175). According to the second criticism, it is intelligible to ask for an explanation of the existence of the infinite collection of dependent beings. However, the answer to this is provided once we learn that each member of the infinite collection has an explanation of its existence (Hume 1955, 40). Thus Hume remarks: Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matters; I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me what the cause of the whole twenty was. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts (40).

Indeed, we may say that the first criticism objects premise (2-2) while the second criticism refutes premise (2-5). However, I think that both Russell's and Hume's attacks on the argument are against strong version of the PSR, or at least require the falsification of strong version of the PSR which is the main and essential base of all Cosmological Arguments. I first think that the upshot of both Hume's and Russell's influential arguments are identical. While Russell denies the existing entity of a collection beside its members, Hume considers the existing entity of a collection within its members. Therefore, for both there is no distinct entity for a collection of dependent beings to be asked for its explanation or cause. Having said that we may conclude that the main difficulty for both Hume and Russell is the strong version of the PSR that definitely requires a collection to have a distinct explanation or cause, regardless of its members, since it is considered as a contingent being or at least an abstract entity which is not excluded from the strong version of the PSR.

It is likely because of these challenges that some have tried to demonstrate a version of Cosmological Argument without the PSR (Katz and Kramer, 1997, pp. 62-70). Regardless of the truth or validity of such arguments, the major difficulty is the substitution of the PSR with other principles which are either a different version of the PSR or not less inconclusive and incoherent than the PSR. For instance, Barnard D. Katz and Elmar J. Kremer employ the Principle of Probable Explanation (PPE) to argue for the existence of God.

2-6- There is no explanation of the infinite collection of dependent beings, therefore,

2-7- It is false that the whole of existing things consists of an infinite collection of dependent beings, therefore,

2-8- It is false that every being is dependent. (Rowe, 1970, p. 441)

The first question is how this argument is to be considered as a Cosmological Argument. The answer is almost obvious if (2-1) has not been supposed as an a priori logical definition and classification and thus far from the nature of the Cosmological Argument. In other words, if (1) has been hold truly as an *a posteriori* approach, which Clarke has stressed by the presumption of existence and that something exists and has existed from eternity, the argument is a Cosmological Argument; otherwise it is to be classified differently. The significance of this consideration results in the third part of the paper that will be clarifying why I call Sadra's argument as a Cosmological Argument but not some of the very similar *Kalam* arguments to West Cosmological Argument as a real Cosmological Argument. The criterion, I think is whether the first premise represents somehow the factual world or the otherwise. In contrast to many contemporary works, I think that Ibn-Sina's contingency argument is for instance not a Cosmological Argument while Sadra's *Siddigin* is a Cosmological Argument.

Having said that, it is clear that the first premise (2-1) is based on the PSR or we may say that the premise is itself the PSR. According to the structure of the argument, a dependent being is a being that has the reason of its existence in the causal efficacy of other being and an independent being is a being that has the reason of its existence within its own nature. This is indeed the strong version of the PSR mentioned as the PSR(1) or PSR(6). Thus the first premise relies on the strong version of the PSR and there is no way of proceeding the argument without the strong version of PSR. Moreover, the argument for (2-2) is also rooted strongly in the PSR; however, most criticisms against (2-2) revolve around the necessity or non-necessity of the collection of dependent beings to an explanation. Therefore, the argument implies that the infinite collection is itself viewed as an existing thing. Because only if it is so viewed, will it follow that the infinite collection must have a cause or explanation of its existence. Second, the question why each number of the infinite collection exists seems to be different from the question why the infinite collection exists. For, although members of the collection have an explanation of their existence yet this does not explain the existence of the entire infinite collection. These two implications of the argument have caused two major criticisms against the Cosmological

The PSR as an essential cooperative principle for the Cosmological Arguments is involved in the first part of the arguments.

Although the argument I shall present and discuss is only one version of the Cosmological Arguments, for convenience I shall frequently speak of this argument as the Cosmological Argument. Moreover, what I have already mentioned that there are different versions of the Cosmological Arguments does not imply that there are no philosophical foundations essential to all versions of the arguments, and if there could be only one, that would be the PSR.

We may restate Clarke's version of the Cosmological Argument as follows (Clarke 2001, pp. 135-138).

1. Whatever exists is either a dependent being or an independent being.
2. Not every being is a dependent being.
3. There exists an independent being.
4. There exists a necessary being.

This argument is similar to what Leibniz has said in this regard:

1. Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3. The universe exists.
4. Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God. (Craig, 2008, pp. 84-87)

Regardless of the divergence or convergence of these two arguments, the critical premise for both arguments is (2). Below is Clarke's proof for (2):

2-1- If every being is dependent then the whole of existing things consists of an infinite collection of dependent beings,

2-2- If the whole of existing things consists of an infinite collection of dependent beings then the infinite collection itself must have an explanation of its existence.

2-3- If the existence of the infinite collection of dependent beings has an explanation then the explanation lies either in the causal efficacy of some being outside the collection or it must lie within the infinite collection itself.

2-4- The explanation of the existence of the infinite collection of dependent beings cannot lie in the causal efficacy of some being outside the collection.

2-5- The explanation of the existence of the infinite collection of dependent beings cannot lie within the collection itself, therefore,

8. Then, the BCCF has an explanation, q. (by (1), (6), and (7))
9. The proposition q is not necessary. (by (2), (6), and (8) and as the conjunction of true contingent proposition is contingent.)
10. Therefore, q is a contingent true proposition. (by (5), (8), and (9))
11. Thus, q is a conjunct in the BCCF.(by (6)and (10))
12. Thus, q is self-explanatory.(by (4), (8)and (11))
13. But q is not self-explanatory.(by (3) and (10))
14. Thus, q is and is not self-explanatory, and that is absurd. Hence, the PSR is false.

(2), (3), and (6), I think, are the main premises that cannot be supposed as true propositions easily. Indeed these three important premises need to be examined more accurately. In doing so I believe that all these three significant propositions have to be reconsidered.

II

There are numbers of various versions of the Cosmological Argument and that these versions differ from one another in ways that are important for logical criticisms and evaluations (Hepborn, 1967, pp. 232-237). Although in this part, Clarke's version of the Cosmological Argument is considered as a typical version, two points concerning the nature of the Cosmological Argument are worth mentioning here.

First, the Cosmological Argument uses a general pattern of argumentation (logos) that makes an inference from certain alleged facts about the world (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally identified with or referred to as God. Among these initial facts are that the world came into being, that the world is contingent in that it could have been other than it is, or that certain beings or events in the world are causally dependent or contingent. From these facts philosophers infer either deductively or inductively that a first cause, a necessary being, an unmoved mover, or a personal being (God) exists. The Cosmological Argument is a part of classical natural theology, whose goal has been to provide some evidence for the claim that God exists. In other words, a Cosmological Argument for the existence of God purports to infer the existence of a necessary being from the existence of one or more contingent existents.

Second, the Cosmological Argument has two distinct parts. The first part is an argument to establish the existence of a necessary being, a being that carries the reason of its existence within itself. The second part is an argument to establish that this necessary being is God.

priori. Instead they have adopted the somewhat more modest view that the Principle is a metaphysical assumption, a presupposition we are forced to make in order to make sense of our world (Rowe, 1968, pp. 284-285).

Row argues that the PSR cannot be considered as the presupposition as well. Hume, Russell and more recently Antony Flew, William Row and Peter Van Inwagen are among those who have been trying to refute the PSR. Although the main purpose of this paper is to examine the reliance of the Cosmological Argument on the PSR, it seems promising to point out to two criticisms on the PSR which I think are faced with major fallacies.

William Rowe, who has been strongly influenced by Hume, has logically refuted the PSR as follows:

1. PSR implies that every state of affairs has a reason either within itself or in some other state of affairs.
2. There are contingent states of affairs.
3. If there are contingent states of affairs then there is some state of affairs for which there is no reason.
4. PSR is false. (Rowe, 1975, p. 104)

The main premise here is (3), and I think it is far from clear why (3) cannot be false. Indeed (3) can be revised as follows:

3. If there are contingent states of affairs, then there is a necessary state of affairs which is the cause for contingent state of affairs (B)
4. It is not necessary (B).
5. It is contingent (B).

(5) is to state that it is contingent that there is a necessary state of affairs which is the cause for the contingent state of affairs.

Peter Van Inwagen has also attempted to demonstrate a formal argument to refute the PSR. The following is the main premise of his argument (Pruss, 2006, pp. 97-99).

1. If the PSR holds, then every true contingent proposition has an explanation.
2. No necessary proposition explains a contingent proposition.
3. No contingent proposition explains itself.
4. If a proposition explains a conjunction, it explains every conjunct. (premise)
5. A proposition q only explains a proposition p if q is true.
6. There is a Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact(BCCF) and the BCCF is contingent.(premise)
7. Suppose the PSR holds.

latter. I think that there is a parity of reasons or a parity of presumptions concerning the validity of the PSR. See for instance these two judgments about the PSR.

Richard Taylor says:

The Principle of Sufficient Reason can be illustrated in various ways as we have done, and if one thinks about it, he is apt to find that he presupposes it in his thinking about reality, but it cannot be proved. It does not appear to be itself a necessary truth, and at the same time it would be most odd to say it is contingent. If one were to try proving it, he would sooner or later have to appeal to considerations that are less plausible than the principle itself. Indeed, it is hard to see how one could even make an argument for it, without already assuming it. For this reason, it might properly be called a presupposition of reason itself. One can deny that it is true without embarrassment or fear or refutation, but one is then apt to find that what he is denying is not really what the principle asserts. We shall, then, treat it here as a datum — not something that is provably true, but as something which all men, whether they ever reflect it or not, seem more or less to presuppose (Taylor, 1992, pp. 99-108).

One the other hand, William Row states that:

Clearly the principle is not logically true. Nor, it would seem that the mere notion of the existence of a thing definitionally contains the notion of a thing being caused ... If this is true the Principle of Sufficient Reason is certainly not analytically true. But if the Principle is not analytically true how can it be necessary? ... it is far from clear that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is a synthetic, necessary proposition known *a priori*.

The difficulty with the view that the Principle, in either its strong or weak form, is necessary, is that we do seem able to conceive of things existing, or even of things coming into existence without having to conceive of those things as having an explanation or cause...In view of this and other difficulties some contemporary defenders of the Cosmological Argument have retreated from the view that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is a synthetic, necessary proposition known *a*

8. For every contingent event there is a cause which is itself an event.
9. For every contingent being (that once did not exist) there is a cause.
10. For every contingent being (that comes into existence) there is a cause.
11. For every contingent being there is a cause (pp. 54-62).

There are other versions of the PSR that can be reduced to one of the above statements. Among the versions of Causal Principle, it seems that (11) is more inclusive than the others, if the term contingent being includes all contingent beings, events and stats of affairs. It is also worth mentioning that although some have tried to unify the two principles, there is a main distinction between the PSR and the Causal Principle. In fact, the Causal Principle involves the necessity of relationship between the cause and the caused, while in PSR the *explanans* and the *explanandum* are not essentially entangled in necessity. I think unless this differentiation is made, one is reduced to the other.

As it is obvious, (1) and (6) are the stronger versions, since (2) is included in (1) and (6); (3) is the requirement of the Causal Principle which is itself included in (1) and (6). (4) can also be reduced to (1) and (6); however, (5) is based on the presupposition that no necessary proposition can be meaningful since it is either analytic or conceptual definition.

To conclude, I think that (6) is the most inclusive version of the PSR, nevertheless there are other versions of the PSR that can be reduced to the above statements. For instance, see the following versions of the PSR:

12. Each true proposition that entails that some contingent concrete object (body or mind) begins to exist has a sufficient reason why it is true.

13. There is a sufficient reason why there are true proposition that entail that some contingent beings exist (Smith, 1995).

14. For all propositions P, (P and not necessarily (P)) entails E (P).

15. For all propositions P, (P and not necessarily (P)) entails possibly (E (P)) (Davey and Clifton, 2001).

Although some of the contemporary philosophers believe that any strong version of the PSR is false and some have even tried to prove that it is necessarily false, there are many fruitful attempts to indicate the truth and validity of the PSR.

The PSR is either *a priori*, no matter if it is even regarded as a synthetic *a priori*, or the presupposition of all human knowledge and science. Many philosophers accept the fact that the PSR is not the former, while the main disagreement between defenders and defeaters refers to the

I

Introduction

Since Leibniz (1646-1716), the scientific literature concerning the so-called Cosmological Arguments for the existence of God has stressed its application on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (hereafter PSR). The principle goes back to at least the early 5th century BC, being used by Parmenides (See: *Eleaticism*, Fragment 8, lines 9-10), but it is most famously associated with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.

A typical expression of this principle is that whatever exists must have an explanation of its existence either in the necessity of its own nature or in the causal efficacy of some other being. In *Monadology*, Leibniz has explained the PSR as follows:

Our reasoning are founded on two great principles, that of contradiction and that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we consider that no fact can be real or actual and no proposition true, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not the otherwise, although most often these reasons cannot at all be known by us (Leibniz, 1951, p. 539).

Indeed the PSR has different versions, both from the degrees of weakness and strength, as well as its affinity and similarity to the Causal Principle. In this paper, I will present the most significant versions of the PSR and the Causal Principle.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)

1. Nothing exists and happens without a reason why it should be so, and not the otherwise (Leibniz, in Alexander, 1956, 2nd letter).
2. For every existent there is an explanation (Rowe, 1975, p. 95).
3. For every existent that comes into the existence there is an explanation (p. 95).
4. For every fact, there is an explanation.
5. For every true contingent proposition, there is an explanation why it is true (Pruss, 2006, p. 70)
6. For every true proposition there is an explanation why it is true (p. 70).

And Causal Principle can also be read as the following versions:

7. For every contingent event there is a cause.

A Comparative Study on the Degree of Dependence of Clarke's and Sadra's Arguments for the Existence of God on the Principle of Sufficient Reason

Seyyed Hassan Hosseini *

Abstract

After briefly discussing the various versions of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (hereafter PSR), I argue that Clarke's classic version of the Cosmological Arguments for the existence of God is rooted in the PSR, while Sadra's so-called Siddigin argument is not based on any weak or strong version of PSR. My paper is thus divided into three parts: (1) the PSR and its significance concerning the Cosmological Arguments for the existence of God, (2) Clarke's version of Cosmological Argument and its dependence on the PSR, (3) Sadra's Siddigin argument for the existence of a necessary being - as a proper correspondent to what constitutes the nature of Cosmological Arguments - and its independence from PSR.

Keywords: *Principle of Sufficient Reason, Cosmological Arguments for the existence of God, Sadra's Siddigin argument*

*. Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.

E-mail: hoseinih@sharif.edu