پژوهشی در بابِ پیروی از هَنجارِ باور

کلانتری، سید علی. (1393). «بازنگری شعار ویلیامز که باور ناظر به هدف صدق است». متافیزیک. شماره 17: 63-76.

Boghossian, P. (2003). The Normativity of content. philosophical Issues, 13: 31-45.

Boghossian, P. (2008). Content and Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Bykvist K.and Hattiangadi. A. (2007). »Does thought implyoght«, Analysis 67(4): 227-285.

Engel, P. (2004). »Truth and the aim of belief.«. In Laws and Models in Science, ed. D. Gillies, London: King’s College 77–97.

Fassio, D. (2011). »Belief, correctness and normativity«. Logique et Analyse, 54: 471-486.

Gluer, K. and Wikforss, A. (2009). »Against Content Normativity«. Mind, 118: 31–70.

Gluer, K. and Wikforss, A. (2010). »The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen«. Mind, 119: 757-761.

Gluer, k. and Wikforss, A. (2013). Against Belief Normativity. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.

 Gluer, K. and Wikforss, A. (2015). »Still No Guidance: Reply to Steglich-Petersen«. Theoria, 81 (3): 272-279.

Kalantari, S. A. and Luntley, M. (2013). On the Logic of Aiming at Truth. Analysis, 73: 419-422.  

-Littlejohn, C. (2012). Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McHugh, C and D. Whiting (forthcoming). The Normativity of Belief. Analysis

Millar, A. (1994). Understanding People. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nolfi, K. (Forthcoming). How to be a normativist about the nature of belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Shah, N. (2003).»How Truth Governs Belief«. The Philosophical Review, 112: 447–482.

Shah, N. (2009). The Normativity of Belief and Self-Fulfilling Normative Beliefs. In David Hunter (ed.), Belief and Agency, supplement to the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

Shah, N. and Velleman, D. (2005).»Doxastic Deliberation«. The Philosophical Review, 114: 497–534.

Steglich-Petersen, A. (2006). »No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief«. Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 499–516.

Steglich-Petersen, A. (2010). »The Truth Norm and Guidance: A reply to Gluer and Wikforss«. Mind, 119 (475):749-755.

Vahid, H. (2006). »Aiming at Truth: Doxastic Vs. Epistemic Goals«. Philosophical Studies, 131: 303-335.

Velleman, D. (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whiting, D. (2010).»Should I believe the truth?«. Dialectica 64: 213–24.

Wedgwood, R. (2007). The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wedgwood, R. (2013). The Right Think to Believe? In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.