کلانتری، سیدعلی. (۱۳۹۷). «بررسی نظریه هنجارمندی منطق با تکیه بر انتقادات هارمن و ارائه تبیینی از این نظریه». فلسفه علم، شماره ۲، صص ۱۰۳–۸۱.
References
Broome, J. (2000). Normative Requirements,‖ in Normativity, ed. J. Dancy. In: Oxford: Blackwell.
Evershed, J. (2021). Another way logic might be normative. Synthese, 199(3), 5861-5881.
Frege, G. (1956). The thought: A logical inquiry. Mind, 65(259), 289-311.
Frege, G. (1979). A brief survey of my logical doctrines. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and Friedrich Kaulbach (eds and trans.). Frege: Posthumous Writings. In: Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Harman, G. (1984). Logic and reasoning. In Foundations: logic, language, and mathematics (pp. 107-127). Springer.
Harman, G. (1986). Change in view: Principles of reasoning. The MIT Press.
MacFarlane, J. (2002). Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism. The philosophical review, 111(1), 25-65.
MacFarlane, J. (2004). In what sense (if any) is logic normative for thought. Unpublished manuscript.
Priest, G. (1979). Two dogmas of quineanism. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 29(117), 289-301.
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References [In Persian]
Kalantari, Seyed Ali. (2019). “An Examination of the Normativity Theory of Logic with Emphasis on Harman’s Critiques and Providing an Explication of This Theory.” Philosophy of Science, No. 2, pp. 81–103. [In Persian]